Public choice

Anno accademico 2018/2019 - 1° anno
Docente: Isidoro Mazza
Crediti: 9
Organizzazione didattica: 225 ore d'impegno totale, 165 di studio individuale, 60 di lezione frontale
Semestre:
ENGLISH VERSION

Obiettivi formativi

To provide knowledge needed to understand the economic underpinnings of non-market decision-making (knowledge and understanding); to prepare students to apply, in a critical and original fashion, what is learnt to the analysis of national and international policies (applying knowledge and understanding).

To stimulate students to exercise theif critical skills so that they are capable to identify the main assumptions of the theory, the instruments adopted and the limits of the theory. The goal is to make students able to integrate the knowledge acquired and apply it to the analysis of institutions and political processes, getting ready for the job market. To prepare student to interpret data to develop critical analysis skills (Making judgments).

To foster the ability of students of exposition of personal opinions to experts as well as a non-specialized public (Communication skills).

To stimulate students to study autonomously and communicate their knowledge clearly (Learning skills).


Modalità di svolgimento dell'insegnamento

Lessons in classroom; seminars by invoted speakers


Prerequisiti richiesti

None. Students are hower encouraged to review basic microeconomics.


Frequenza lezioni

Not mandatory


Contenuti del corso

Public choice applies the economic pronciples to the political deicision-making process. Among the topics illustrated in the course are: the role and the function of the government, the decision-making process of the government and of the actors that take decisions and implement them; the decision-making mechanisms in direct democracy; electoral competition; the relationship between private and public interests; the relationship electors-politicians and politicians-bureaucrats; the effect of the evolution of governemnts; the politcal business cycles; normative aspect of collective decision rules.


Testi di riferimento

Mueller, Dennis, Public Choice III. Cambridge University Press, 2003.



Programmazione del corso

 ArgomentiRiferimenti testi
1Introduction to public choice. Origins of the state: public goods and prisoner's dilemmaPages 1-12 
2Origins of the state: public goods and coordination games Pages 13-18  
3Voluntary supply of public goods and externalitiesPages 18-27 
4Coase theorem; experimental analysis of voluntary supply of public goodsPages 27-30; 40-42 
5Reasons for collective choice: redistributionPages 44-56 
6Unanimity rulePages 67-78 
7Majority rule: positive propertiesPages 79-85 
8The median voter theoremPages 85-92 
9Logrolling; agenda manipulationPages 104-107, 112-117 
10Majority rule: normative propertiesPages 128-135, 136-144 
11Alternatives to majority rulePages 147-157 
12Theory of clubs; voting with the feetPages 182-189, 199-202 
13FederalismPages 209-215 
14Intergovernmental grantsPages 215-228 
15Electoral competition with deterministic votingPages 230-236, 241-246 
16Electoral competition with probabilistic votingPages 252-260 
17Multiparty systemsPages 264-284 
18The paradox of votingPages 303-329 
19Rent-seekingPages 333-338, 340-357 
20BureaucracyPages 359-365 
21Extensions of Niskanen modelPages 365-373 
22Legislative decision making in EuropePages 386-388, 399-405 
23Political competition and macroeconomicsPages 429, 437-459 
24Voter behavior, deficitsPages 459-470 
25Interest groupsPages 472-497 
26The size of governmentPages 501-529 
27Social welfare functionsPages 563-578 
28Arrow's theoremPages 582-595 
29A theory of justicePages 597-613 
30Review of the course 

Verifica dell'apprendimento

Modalità di verifica dell'apprendimento

Written exam. Students should prove that they have understood the theoretical issue indicated in the question and be able to demonstrate the result, if requested.


Esempi di domande e/o esercizi frequenti

  1. Normative features of direct democracy:
  2. Economic theory of bureaucracy
  3. Rent-seeking
  4. Oates model of decentralization
  5. Tiebout model
  6. Electoral competition and deterministic voting
  7. Electoral competition and probabilistic voting
  8. Median voter theorem
  9. Lobbying